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DEMOCRACY: DIRECT, REPRESENTATIVE, AND
DELIBERATIVE
Janet A. Flammang*

Kenneth P. Miller's well-researched and thoughtprovoking article maintains that a useful way to understand
California's initiative process is by comparing Populist and
While the
Progressive conceptions of direct democracy.
Populist impulse mistrusts and undermines the power of
representative government, the Progressive stance trusts and
Miller makes a
reforms governmental institutions.
convincing case that the Populist view of direct democracy
has prevailed in California's initiative's structure (no
legislative input, hearings, or amendments), process (no
checks and balances, accountability, deliberation, or
opponents' input), and substance (less legislative flexibility,
majoritarian values at the expense of minority rights, and
Miller supports Populistpressure on the courts).
constraining reforms that enhance the role of the legislature
(legislative review, amendments, and counsel), and that
generally make the process harder (supermajority votes for
constitutional amendments, tightening the single subject
rule, word limits, signature-gathering hurdles, regulations of
paid petition gatherers, and, with reservations, pre-election
review by the courts or attorney general).
I submit that the Populist-Progressive schema is more
useful for helping us to understand how we got to this point
than it is in mapping where we should go from here. While
* Ph.D., University of California, Los Angeles; M.A., University of
California, Los Angeles; B.A., University of California, Los Angeles. The author
is an Associate Dean, College of Arts and Sciences and Professor, Department of
Political Science, Santa Clara University.
1. Kenneth P. Miller, ConstrainingPopulism: The Real Challenge of
Initiative Reform, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1037 (2001).
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these two strands of thought have strongly influenced
California's initiative politics, a Progressive call to constrain
Populism will not work in California's political climate, and a
new framework is needed.
To begin with the schema's historical relevance,
conditions in California that gave rise to the governmental
reform measures at the outset of the twentieth century in
many respects resemble those in its last three decades, the
period of heavy use of initiatives: recessions (in the 1890s and
the early 1970s), a marked increase in immigration (in the
1890s and the 1980s), violence in the streets (against striking
workers earlier, and in Watts and Berkeley later), and a nonresponsive government (whether beholden to the Southern
Pacific Railroad or sitting on a surplus budget as property
taxes skyrocketed).
Additionally, both Populist and
Progressive strains are still heard in California's political
discourse: Populists' individualism, suspicion of concentrated
power, anti-elitism, and faith in the common person;
Progressives' reformist optimism, middle-class moralism, and
faith in experts and the educated person. Populists have a
dualistic analysis of power and politics: big/little, rich/poor,
common/elite; while Progressives have a tripartite analysis:
lower/middle/upper. So in the case of immigration, as we saw
in the debate about Proposition 187, the Populist impulse is
to see newcomers as needy, non-productive, foreign "them,"
while the Progressive impulse is to see newcomers as
potential taxpaying citizens and members of the middle class
through hard work and education. In debates around many
initiatives, Progressives object to what they describe as
Populist xenophobia, demagoguery, and simplistic attacks on
government as the problem, while Populists take issue with
Progressives' obscure jargon, endless tinkering with
governmental structures, and simplistic view of government
as the solution.
The dominance of these two worldviews has been
reflected in California's choice of governors. Governor Pat
Brown presided over the Progressive late-1950s and early
1960s. With the state's postwar industrial growth and public
infrastructure expansion, government was the solution and
could be trusted. In the mid-1960s, in the wake of the
Berkeley free speech movement and the Watts riot, Governor
Ronald Reagan voiced Populist sentiments in describing
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government's irresponsible spending as the problem, and
promising to crack down on ungrateful students and other
disruptive people. In the mid-1970s, Governor Jerry Brown's
administration was a mix of Progressivism's clean
government and Populism's small government and anti-elitist
critique of the University of California. It was during his
administration that Proposition 13 began to change the
landscape in Sacramento in the Populist direction described
2
so eloquently in Peter Schrag's ParadiseLost.
Given the historical importance of these two impulses in
California politics, and agreeing with both Peter Schrag and
Kenneth Miller about the hamstrung condition of the
California legislature, what is the problem with using the
Populist-Progressive framework for recommending reforms at
this point in time? Why not curb Populism in the name of
Two conditions markedly different from
Progressivism?
Hiram Johnson's time-weakened political parties and the
power of screen culture-have created a new climate that
necessitates a new definition of democracy in which to frame
a call for reforms.
(initiative,
Progressive direct democracy reforms
referendum, recall, and direct primaries) succeeded in
limiting the power of political parties. Progressives wanted
city contracts to be awarded on the basis of "what you know"
(professional qualifications) not "who you know" (machine
cronyism). "Good government" measures benefited not only
their sense of the common good (sanitary conditions, efficient
agencies, and the like), but also their social class (educated
professionals). Political machines were corrupt, but they also
helped earlier immigrant groups get an economic foothold and
a partisan identity in the United States. Today's immigrants
in California have ties to local community groups, which may
or may not be politicized. But they do not have access to
political parties the way their earlier counterparts did. They
have one less way to become informed and active citizens.
Today's Progressives have to bear in mind that a middleclass, white, professional bias lurks beneath the surface of
their analysis. They have to realize how their arguments
sound to the newly arrived. Trust elected officials and
experts in Sacramento to represent you (even as they approve
2.

PETER SCHRAG, PARADISE LOST: CALIFORNIA'S EXPERIENCE, AMERICA'S

FUTURE (1999).
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billions of dollars of tax loopholes for their campaign
contributors). Understand their elaborate cost-benefit models
(which presuppose a college, if not a graduate school, level of
education).
Carefully read the voters' pamphlet before
deciding how to vote for dozens of people and issues (with
limited English language skills and perhaps a high school
education). Given the high rates of immigration in the 1980s,
it will take time for newcomers to be assimilated to
participatory citizenship, given language barriers and, for
many, experiences with repressive governments in their
countries of origin, for which Populist concepts make sense.
Progressive calls to limit the initiative can sound like an
elitist attempt to silence the voice of the people.
Another new condition is the ubiquity of the screen
culture: information, advertisements, and entertainment
courtesy of computers, television, movies, and videos. Today's
informed citizens rely less on people and more on screens;
they have to tune out the self-serving ads and stimulating
entertainment to get at the relevant information; they can
acquire phenomenal amounts of information without leaving
home; they support national referenda and global democracy
movements. Just as the screen culture has extraordinary
democratizing potential, it can also be a vehicle for
manipulation, distortion, deceit, and infotainment. But there
is no denying its role in citizen education in recent years.
With at least one television in most California households,
citizens form their political views from news programs and
talk shows, and proponents of initiatives have to go to the
airways to reach the voters. Any attempt to reform the
initiative process has to take as its starting point the
pervasiveness of the screen culture.
There is growing evidence that the rise of the screen
culture has been accompanied by a corresponding decline in
personal contacts, interpersonal trust, and trust in
government. Robert Putnam has written about Americans'
shrinking access to the "social capital" that is the reward for
community activity, sharing, and connectedness. 3 Over the
past twenty-five years, Americans have become increasingly
disconnected from family, friends, neighbors, churches and
temples, PTA, recreation clubs, and political parties. The
3. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000).

20011

DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

1089

Washington Post conducted a study regarding citizen trust of
government in 1995. 4 It found a connection between declining
trust in government and erosion of personal trust among
Americans. Each generation was less trustful than the one
before and government officials are equally skeptical of the
citizenry. A 1998 study conducted by the Pew Research
Center concluded that, "public distrust of government is
paralleled by a belief among members of Congress,
presidential appointees, and senior civil servants that the
American public is too ill-informed to make wise decisions
about important issues. "5
In order to get out of this morass of mistrust and
disconnectedness, we need to look at democracy in a new way.
The Populist-Progressive schema locks us into two choices:
direct democracy and representative democracy. It is time to
The
adopt a third alternative: deliberative democracy!
either
be
can
democracy
indirect
and
products of both direct
It should not be
well-deliberated or poorly-deliberated.
assumed that California's governor and legislature will
automatically produce well-deliberated legislation and that
the initiative process will automatically produce poorlygovernmental
Admittedly,
legislation.
deliberated
institutions are the venue we most often think of as
deliberative bodies: providing public accountability, the airing
of different points of view, due consideration of outcomes, and
weighing of public benefits. But they do not hold a monopoly
as venues of deliberation. For years, the print and broadcast
media, educational institutions, civic organizations, and more
recently the Internet, performed similar functions. Rather
than valorizing the legislative process (representative
democracy) or constraining the initiative process (direct
democracy), we ought to ask what reforms enhance
deliberation in both cases (deliberative democracy). There is
nothing we can do to prevent California governors from using
initiatives to bolster their anticipated Presidential bids, or
demagogues from inflaming the worst fears of voters. But
trust in public officials will increase to the extent that their
4. See DAVID S. BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED: INITIATIVE CAMPAIGNS
AND THE POWER OF MONEY 229 (2000).
5. Id. at 230.

6. For a discussion of the notion of deliberative democracy, see CASS
SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (2001).
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behavior is seen as deliberative, and the quality of initiatives
will improve the more deliberative the process that produces
them.
Reforms on both fronts should stem from the defining
conditions for and characteristics of deliberative democracy:
an educated and informed citizenry with common civic
experiences; a public forum with an open airing of opposing
points of view; a discussion anticipating social, economic, and
political consequences
of legislation; a clear and
straightforward presentation of issues in language
understandable by citizens; conditions that foster the
exchange of reasoning; disclosure of self-interests and
arguments about the general good; accountability; and
building trust and the willingness to compromise.
On these grounds, for instance, one would not object to
an Internet referendum because it involves too many people
too directly, but rather because it is insular, cut off from other
points of view.
One could defend the legislature's
involvement in the initiative process on deliberative grounds
by providing its considered judgement of a measure, printed
in the voter's handbook, aired on the radio, or in newspaper
op-ed pieces. One could justify an increase in legislative
policy staff on deliberative grounds. As long as we are locked
into the Populist language of "bad big government" and "good
small government," then anything the legislature tries to do
to regain its policy-making flexibility will be criticized as
"more big government." We need to shift from thinking
of
government as good or bad, big or little, problem or solution,
to lawmaking as more or less thought through in deliberative
manner.
In 1992 the bipartisan California Commission on
Campaign Financing published a report on the uses and
abuses of the initiative.7 Many of its recommendations should
be promoted in terms of enhancing a deliberative democracy.
First, require the Fair Political Practices Commission to hold
public hearings on the merits of any initiative that had
gathered a quarter of the signatures needed to qualify.
Second, require the legislature to hold a public hearing on
each initiative within ten days of its qualifying. Third, allow
proponents to amend the initiative after the legislative
7. See BRODER, supra note 3, at 210-12.
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hearing. Fourth, create a forty-five day "cooling off period" in
which the initiative sponsors and the legislature could
negotiate compromise legislation. Fifth, allow the legislature
to enact the initiative during these forty-five days and the
sponsor to remove it from the ballot. Sixth, require the
legislature to vote on any initiative reaching the ballot, and
the Secretary of State to publicize in the voter's pamphlet
each legislator's vote. Seventh, limit the length of initiatives.
Eighth, improve financial reporting, including disclosure of
Ninth, make the voter's
principal sponsors in the ads.
friendly.
pamphlet more reader
There are many deliberative opportunities that can be
provided through a reconceptualized voter pamphlet, a more
responsible media, and a reinvigorated educational
curriculum. Governments can increase levels of financing for
public affairs programming on television. Media can increase
their coverage of state politics. Schools can strengthen their
programs in civic education. In the face of declining interest
in political science as a major, the American Political Science
Association recently embarked upon a nationwide effort to
promote civic education. Universities can require a basic
grounding in American government, especially by tying
community-service projects to the curriculum. Public officials
have to do their part to educate citizens in order to restore
public trust. They should experiment with new Internet
technologies to make more information about government
available to the public and to provide forums for the
deliberation of issues.8
Many California voters say they turn out on Election Day
because they care about a ballot initiative. This is not the
time for Progressives to put the breaks on popular interest in
voting. It is the time to work for reforms that make the
legislative process, both direct and indirect, more
deliberative. When it comes to making policy choices for
California, let's worry less about how we proceed-directly or
indirectly-and more about the deliberative quality of those
decisions.

8. Many of these reforms are discussed in DEREK C. BOK, THE TROUBLE
WITH GOVERNMENT (2001).

